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Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 22.10.19

 

Is burnout simply the result of working too hard? Josh Cohen argues that the root of the problem lies deeper than that

(...)

The depressive burnout, Ehrenberg suggests, feels incapable of making meaningful choices. This, as we discovered in the course of analysis, is Steve’s predicament. In his emotionally chilly childhood home, the only attention he received from his parents was their rigorous monitoring of his schoolwork and extra-curricular activities. In his own mind, he was worth caring about only because of his achievements. So while he accrued awards and knowledge and skills, he never learned to be curious about who he might be or what he might want in life. Having unthinkingly acquiesced in his parents’ prescription of what was best for him, he simply didn’t know how to deal with, or even make sense of, the sudden, unexpected feeling that the life he was living wasn’t the one for him

(...)

... the body and mind crying out for an essential human need: a space free from the incessant demands and expectations of the world. In the consulting room, there are no targets to be hit, no achievements to be crossed off. The amelioration of burnout begins in finding your own pool of tranquillity where you can cool off.

 

publicado às 06:00

 

Power Causes Brain Damage

publicado às 08:56

 

Worse, they don’t seem to want to understand it.

By

Dr. Carroll is a physicist.

 

Physicists brought up in the modern system will look into your eyes and explain with all sincerity that they’re not really interested in understanding how nature really works; they just want to successfully predict the outcomes of experiments.

 

Meanwhile, it turns out that how reality works might actually matter. Our best attempts to understand fundamental physics have reached something of an impasse, stymied by a paucity of surprising new experimental results. Scientists discovered the Higgs boson in 2012, but that had been predicted in 1964. Gravitational waves were triumphantly observed in 2015, but they had been predicted a hundred years before. It’s hard to make progress when the data just keep confirming the theories we have, rather than pointing toward new ones.

 

publicado às 08:41

 

The Secret Power of Menopause

Liza Mundy

publicado às 08:23

 

Devil’s advocacy injects normative rigor into a group inquiry—but in quite a specific way, namely by containing a predictable well of enthusiasm in a given direction.

 

Groups tend to “cascade” in the direction of least resistance (...)  (... )Thinking together is riddled with pitfalls, but we can’t really claim to live together without doing it. That is why we need devil’s advocates: they safeguard group-deliberation from the inside. The devil’s advocate defends faith and justice by being in the group but not of it: by keeping the group divided against itself, she holds a space for truth against the pressure of consensus. A devil’s advocate is, for instance, well set up to hunt for as-yet unshared information, since for her the sharing of information is never an attempt to be on the same page as other people.

 

Indulgence in excess is so easy, self-restraint is so hard. If social media exaggerates these problems, that is also a kind of virtue: perhaps we have never been able to see, so clearly, what it looks like when we all try to get along. It’s not pretty. You can leave Facebook or Twitter, but you can’t really leave the ugliness behind. Technical skill is essential to informing our judgments, but it cannot be the ultimate ground of our getting along with one another. We cannot ask the authorities, experts or science to do all our thinking for us. Sometimes, we need to think as a group, and that means we cannot afford to cynically dismiss “devil’s advocacy” as a term of opprobrium. It has to become an honorific.

by  Agnes Callard in  Examined Life. Daqui

 

publicado às 08:16


Leituras pela manhã II- pensar probabilidades

por beatriz j a, em 30.08.19

 

 

the-concept-of-probability-is-not-as-simple-as-you-think?

Nevin Climenhaga

The gambler, the quantum physicist and the juror all reason about probabilities: the probability of winning, of a radioactive atom decaying, of a defendant’s guilt. But despite their ubiquity, experts dispute just what probabilities are. This leads to disagreements on how to reason about, and with, probabilities – disagreements that our cognitive biases can exacerbate, such as our tendency to ignore evidence that runs counter to a hypothesis we favour. Clarifying the nature of probability, then, can help to improve our reasoning.

 

publicado às 08:59


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 14.08.19

 

Uma entrevista muito interessante de ler. As profissões onde se ajudam pessoas são as mais difícies de viver com paixão e as pessoas que o fazem, quer dizer, que juntam a paixão ao profissionalismo, são uma minoria mas fazem uma enorme diferença na vida das pessoas. Na governação, por exemplo, podem passar 100 anos sem aparecer uma única. A medicina, a educação, a política, algumas áreas do direito, quando são exercidos assim, com convicção e saber, são algumas dessas profissões. Sem desmerecer de outras. 

 

Tenho sempre muitos alunos que entram no 10º ano a querer ir para medicina mas, felizmente, só uns poucos têm notas para isso. Digo, felizmente, porque há miúdos que vemos logo ali que não têm o que é preciso para ser médico, quer dizer, são muito trabalhadores mas só estudam o necessário, só se interessam pelo que sai no exame, tem um grande desprezo pelas ciências humanas, etc. Quando já nos conhecemos bem e falamos dos cursos que querem seguir, digo-lhes para terem cuidado com o que escolhem e, depois de escolher, dediquem-se à escolha, pois há profissões que não podem exercer-se com uma atitude blasé, há pessoas a depender de quem as exerce e a maneira como a exercem deixa marcas indeléveis na vida das pessoas. A medicina é uma dessas profissões. Não é para toda a gente.

 

Se a medicina for só computadores acabou a medicina

Cristina Pestana

 

publicado às 10:04

 

Oliver Sacks e um fotógrafo com síndrome de Tourette em viagem pela Europa.

 

My Travels with Oliver Sacks

 

publicado às 07:59

 

Heather Altfeld e Rebecca Diggs:

When it comes to popular film, the philosopher Owen Hulatt at the University of York, a scholar of Theodor Adorno, notes that:

No space is left for consumers to exhibit ‘imagination and spontaneity’ – rather, they are swept along in a succession of predictable moments, each of which is so easy to digest that they can be ‘alertly consumed even in a state of distraction’.
.

Since the advent of photography, the image has become a truth we trust more than our own memories and imaginations. After viewing the film version of his novel Affliction (1989), Russell Banks noted that he had great difficulty retaining visual images of his own characters, the ones he himself conceived when writing the book. ‘[I]n my imagination,’ he told The New York Times, ‘the faces, bodies and voices of the movies’ stars have displaced the faces, bodies and voices of my characters …’ What’s more, images can never convey the full depth of a multisensory experience: they are perceived unisensorially by what the psychologist Robert Romanyshyn in 2009 called‘the despotic eye’, our dominant sensory source of truth. Neither the other senses nor the imagination are required to grasp them.

 

Segundo os autores, as práticas pedagógicas actuais - analíticas, quantificáveis, rígidas e cartesianas, digo eu: 'aprende-se' um poema dissecando-o nas suas partes como quem disseca uma rã e separa todos os orgãos antes de os voltar a ligar, favorecem a literalidade, a rígidez mental, a uniformidade interpretativa e a mesmidade e privam os alunos do desenvolvimento da imaginação, da capacidade de metáfora e da riqueza subtil da linguagem.

Favorecem a dicotomia e o maniqueísmo. São mais fáceis de ensinar, pois dissecar um poema ou um texto em partes, com recurso a uma fórmula, a técnicas standardizáveis, racionalizáveis e categorizáveis que podem testar-se em escolhas múltiplas ou afins é fácil; díficil é trabalhá-lo com a imaginação, com a linguagem, com o questionamento, permitir que os alunos se apropriem dele de um modo particular e individual e depois avaliar os seus textos com matrizes e pontos de foco diversos.

 

Os textos literários, com estas abordagens, em vez de vivos na sua riqueza supratemporal tornam-se cadáveres que se dissecam, coisas distantes que nada têm a ver com a nossa experiência da vida. Em vez de proporcionarem metáforas para as pessoas se compreenderem e expandirem as suas experiências mentais interiores, são pensados como meros recursos intelectuais de desenvolvimento de técnicas e de discursos de literalidade.

 

É muito diferente trabalhar a Antígona ou o poema dos Lusíadas como ideias e sentimentos vivos que podem transpôr-se para a nossa experiência actual (uma vez que os problemas humanos, embora com contextos e roupagens diferentes são os problemas humanos) e alargá-la que trabalhá-los como coisas inertes e mortas. O passado fala connosco se não o vemos como uma coisa, apenas.

 

Que tipo de pessoas estamos a formar com estas técnicas que excluem tudo o que não é quantificável como subjectividades negativas?

Fala-se muito em diversidade, em inclusão mas depois todo o ensino está feito para a exclusão do que é diverso e não pode medir-se em testes de escolha múltipla.

 

Os autores contam que um conjunto de professores com muitas dúvidas acerca das respostas correctas num teste de escolha múltipla sobre um poema, escreveu à autora, pedindo ajuda e que a própria autora do poema não foi capaz de responder às questões sobre o seu poema... quer dizer, isto diz muito da inadequação de certas abordagens a certo tipo de textos literários e artísticos cuja riqueza ultrapassa em muito a mera estrutura lógica. 

 

Talvez estas anatomias da literatura sejam adequadas a um ensino universitário mas não o são num ensino primário, médio ou secundário, quando as mentes estão ainda em formação e precisam de abrir caminhos, não fechá-los.

 

publicado às 08:17

 

(Academics are fast becoming a minority in universities, with the number of administrators increasingby more than 100 percent in the last 30 years, vastly outpacing any commensurate rise in either the number of students or faculty.) And they are employed to do a job; managers gonna manage, after all. What else to do but change stuff? No university manager ever got a good performance review for stating to a supervisor, “Well, I carried out an evaluation of the structure of the degree, and it seems to be working really well; we don’t need to change anything at this stage.” Regardless of whether or not they’re correct, that person’s career is going precisely nowhere.

 

Chris Fleming in The Tyranny of Trendy Ideas - Academics pretend to be above cheap and trivial fads. We aren’t.

 

publicado às 07:00


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 01.07.19

 

One can’t just turn away, hoping for a deus ex machina to hose down the flames. Neither would a simple rejection of hell inherently be an embrace of happiness. The good life—a life of possibility and joy, of hope and growth, of a chance to redeem others and be redeemed in turn by their love—does not merely appear as a fantastical gift when one trains attention away from a burning world. Without fully considering a horrible situation, without examining what Arendt calls “the real story,” we grant hell the grand power of limitless myth, one that we never engage with directly but only invoke, theorize, and fear. To recognize hell in the realm of reality is to understand its true role in our lives right now—and to begin to articulate the good life we hope someday to earn. Be not distracted: the glimpses of hell do us good.

 

Human beings don’t all react the same way to a bad situation, however. Each person encounters hell first as an individual; for some that’s also where the response ends. In 1759, nearly two decades before publishing his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wondered about a proper moral response for a European man to faraway disaster in Asia. He imagined one “would make many melancholy reflections upon the precariousness of human life, and the vanity of all the labors of man, which could thus be annihilated in a moment.” But after expressing a modicum of humane sentiment, the man would move on, “pursue his business or his pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and tranquility, as if no such accident had happened.”

 

Smith even criticized the idea that one might care about the well-being of others enough to have it affect one’s own life. He lamented the existence of “those whining and melancholy moralists, who are perpetually reproaching us with our happiness, while so many of our brethren are in misery.” The Scotsman preferred instead a person who knew how to keep his boundaries up: one of “real constancy and firmness,” someone “wise and just who has been thoroughly bred in the great school of self-command,” who can be exposed to injustice but remain in control of “passive feelings on all occasions.” The individualist advice feels familiar: you must stay calm enough to put on your own oxygen mask.

 

The late writer Ursula K. Le Guin offered in 1973 a thought experiment that tests this idea. Inspired by a moral formulation of William James and along the lines of a scheme proposed in Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas” describes an absolutely happy society whose pure joy is predicated on the total misery of one captive child. Nothing can be done for the child or “all the prosperity and beauty and delight of Omelas would wither and be destroyed…to throw away the happiness of thousands for the chance of the happiness of one: that would be to let guilt within the walls.” Most accept the bargain. But others simply walk away and never come back. Where do they go? The narrator cannot describe the place and admits “it is possible that it does not exist.”

 

The reaction of these Omelans is not individualist, but neither is it one of “melancholy moralists.” They walk toward an unknown, toward the possibility of a paradisiacal life that is not contingent on the unremitting torture of another person. They abandon persistent bliss when that bliss is revealed to be corrupt and, per Arendt, “take their point of departure.” The scholar Shoshana Milgram Knapp has argued that by bringing the reader to this new horizon, Le Guin showcases “the limits of dissent.” It is not possible—even in Omelas, a city of fable conceived by a master of speculative fiction—to reorganize in small increments a society with such an elemental atrocity at its heart. The Omelans who exit are not turning their backs: they demonstrate the extraordinary difficulty of recognizing malevolence and refusing to countenance it.

 

Staying in Omelas, that is, generally gets presented as the most reasonable choice.

(...)

It’s not easy to do, and it’s impossible to do alone—one can’t be duty-bound to humanity at large without concern for another. Smith’s assertion that one should stay self-composed even while a faraway land undergoes a fatal calamity is sensible advice to get through one’s daily life without falling apart. But the strange and terrible truth in a world spewing forth the deathly effects of human-caused climate violence, one thundering with violent shows of inane, racist force—our world—is that every day presents new reminders of how inseparable care for one life is to care for another.

(...)

Ovid wrote in his Metamorphoses that when Orpheus went down to the underworld to find his love, Eurydice, “all the places that he’d seen before / He recognized again.” He passed through these horrors to find her and began to lead her back into the light. “There hand in hand they stroll, the two together,” Ovid wrote. “Sometimes he follows as she walks in front.” I chose to put out of mind what happened next in the myth. My wife and I—we are not living a myth. We got engaged in view of a glacier we knew might not survive our lifetimes. We’re alive in the world, this world, to which we are beholden, as we are to each other, as we are to all. We are only two, but two is a beginning. I grabbed her left hand with my right and did not let go.

 

Hell Breaks Loose, Searching for hope in a blazing world. By Henry Freedland

 

publicado às 06:56


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 03.06.19

 

Estudos (The Gendering of Language...)mostram claramente que a designação gramatical genérica masculina afecta negativamente a igualdade de género e a linguagem de género afecta o pensamento de género (Grammatical gender affects gender perception). Portanto, devia fazer-se mudanças na maneira como designamos pronomes, profissões, cargos, etc.

 

publicado às 05:40


Leituras pela manhã - Against cheerfulness

por beatriz j a, em 28.05.19

 

The Ancient Greeks named four virtues: temperance, wisdom, courage and justice. Aristotle added more, but cheerfulness wasn’t one of them. The Greek philosophers didn’t seem to care about how we felt compared with how we acted. Aristotle said that we would ideally feel good while acting good, but he didn’t consider pleasure necessary for beautiful action. Acting virtuously meant steering clear of excess and deficiency. But in order to reach his ‘mean’, we need to jettison every action that misses the mark. Most of the time, the mean is incredibly tough to find, but if it came down to a choice between feeling good while acting badly or feeling badly while acting good, Aristotle said to choose good behaviour. He understood that feelings are hard to control, sometimes impossible, but he also knew that positive feelings like to hang around virtuous actions. While we’re waiting for the good feelings to show up, he asked us to get to work on temperance, wisdom, courage and justice. But he never said anything about smiling through it.

The Roman Stoics inched closer to prescribing cheerfulness when they decided that we should pay attention to our feelings. They believed that we could control our attitudes. But even they didn’t champion cheerfulness, despite the American translators who try to poison them with it. For example, Marcus Aurelius, in his Meditations, advised himself to be εὔνους, literally ‘good-minded’. This was translated into English as ‘good-natured’ by Francis Hutcheson and James Moore in 1742 in Scotland, and then as ‘benevolence’ by the British translator George Long in 1862, before returning to ‘good-natured’ in 1916 under the influence of another British translator, C R Haines. In 2003, Gregory Hays, from Indianapolis, translated εὔνους as ‘cheerfulness’. Maybe Hays was a boy scout. Or Christian. Or both.

publicado às 07:16


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 21.05.19

 

Having ignored questions of economic inequality for decades, economists and other scholars have recently discovered a panoply of effects that go well beyond the fact that some people have too much money and many don’t have enough. Inequality affects our physical and mental health, our ability to get along with one another and to make our voices heard and our political system accountable, and, of course, the futures that we can offer our children. Lately, I’ve noticed a feature of economic inequality that has not received the attention it deserves. I call it “intellectual inequality.”

 

A nation whose citizens have no knowledge of history is asking to be led by quacks, charlatans, and jingos. As he has proved ever since he rode to political prominence on the lie of Barack Obama’s birthplace, Trump is all three. And, without more history majors, we are doomed to repeat him.

 

Eric Alterman in The Decline of Historical Thinking

 

publicado às 06:41


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 16.05.19

 

The proper task of philosophy, even more important today, perhaps, than ever before, is to keep alive rational – that is, imaginative and critical – thinking about our most urgent and fundamental problems of thought and life. It is, above all, to keep alive such thinking about our most fundamental problem of all, which can be put like this: how can our human world, the world as it appears to us, the world we live in and see, touch, hear and smell, the world of living things, people, consciousness, free will, meaning and value – how can all of this exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical Universe?

(...)

As a result of getting progress-achieving methods generalised from those of science, into social life, we can begin to achieve real social progress towards a civilised world akin, to some extent, to the intellectual progress achieved by science. There would be some hope that we can begin to solve the grave global problems that threaten our future: climate change, destruction of the natural world, population growth, the menace of nuclear weapons, and the rest. So vital is this task of tackling our problems exploiting aim-oriented rationality that we urgently need all the resources of universities to help us learn how to do it. Academia needs to be transformed so that its basic task becomes to help humanity resolve those conflicts and problems of living that need to be solved if we are to make progress towards a genuinely civilised world.

Nicholas Maxwell in 'bring-back-science-and-philosophy-as-natural-philosophy'

 

publicado às 07:49

 

The tendency to see the world from an epistemically egocentric perspective is a general feature of human cognition (see Nickerson 1999; Royzman et al.)

Epistemic egocentrism becomes ‘the curse of knowledge’ when it leads to suboptimal results. For example, it can interfere with our ability to communicate and explain, make it more difficult for others to learn from us (...)

 

Intellectual Humility

Although the study of intellectual humility is fairly new, philosophers and psychologists have already offered a variety of accounts of this virtue. Unfortunately, there is little agreement on how to define intellectual humility. Instead of providing a definition, I will briefly survey the literature and draw out a list of qualities commonly associated with intellectual humility. (...)

 

As C.S. Lewis (2012) wrote, “Humility is not thinking less of yourself but thinking of yourself less”.

 

I’ll wrap up this exploration of the literature on humility by drawing out some typical characteristics of the intellectually humble person. I do not pretend these are individually necessary or jointly sufficient, but I do claim that someone who exhibits a set of these qualities has something worth calling ‘intellectual humility’.

 

The intellectual humble person will:

 

• not think too highly of themselves or be too impressed by their admired features

• not think that one’s beliefs or attitudes are better or more correct than other viewpoints

• not show conceit or be arrogant, which stems from a high opinion of oneself

• not overestimate or exaggerate their good features or achievements

• show low concern for how special their talents are

• show low concern for how their intellect is perceived; i.e. will lack intellectual vanity

• not boast or brag about their intellectual accomplishments

• not demand (and often refuse to accept) special treatment or honors, even when deserving

• not be defensive when challenged or try to explain away their intellectual shortcomings

• take complaints and criticism seriously, even when the criticizers are not authority figures

• acknowledge their mistakes and shortcomings

• have an increased propensity to defer to others

• generously acknowledge the contributions of others

• show open-mindedness to new ideas

• show concern for (or ‘own’) their intellectual limitations

 

This highlights the heterogeneity of behaviors and characteristics that philosophers and psychologists have taken to characterize intellectual humility. Given this heterogeneity, it is not surprising that several very different accounts of this virtue have been developed. I propose we take this heterogeneity at face value without succumbing to the philosophical urge—perhaps an imprint of Socrates’s legacy—to find some deeper underlying unity to them all.

 

 

publicado às 06:12

 

Para la inmensa mayoría de la población mundial, el problema no es el pretendido nihilismo engendrado por el capitalismo tardío, sino el advenimiento, o la restauración, de formas de explotación salvajes y de sistemas industriales propios del capitalismo primitivo y que recuerdan a los campos de concentración.

in Cómo salir del odio: entrevista con el filósofo Jacques Rancière

 

publicado às 06:35


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 06.02.19

 

IMG_2611.jpeg

daqui:

IMG_2612.jpeg

 

 

publicado às 08:02


Leituras pela manhã

por beatriz j a, em 28.11.18

 

 

The Glacier River by Tom Hegen (drone photo)

 

We build the boxes we live in, write on square pieces of paper, and invented the four-cornered frame. This frame is what separates us from nature itself... 

Frames are a way of defining focus, of establishing its limits. A painting does not spread to the periphery, it occupies a space within four corners (rarely a circle). Why this is, has much to do with history. Our ancestors painted on cave walls without regard for formal rules of display. The Greeks painted on everything, from bowls to amphorae to buildings. But sometime thereafter, the quadrate became the most convenient means of representation, almost as though the painter already knew that photography would necessarily use the same form, the capture form of a rectangle. Early on, papyrus, parchment and eventually paper were quadrate, the most efficient way to transcribe language.

 

Photography introduced the frame to real life, taking it out of the museums and churches, and putting it on our tables, our walls, and in our books and photo albums. Aesthetic or not, the image within the frame came to define a place, a moment, a person, the content the result of a conscious choice.

 

Until now, the contemplation of natural beauty has always been horizontal—nature seen from eye level. It’s one of the reasons people flock to high places—mountain tops, skyscrapers—not just to see more, but to shift the angle of our horizontal gaze just enough to engender the ‘aha’ moment. What we really want are wings. But unlike Daedalus and Icarus, it’s escapism we’re after, not escape.

 

In ancient times, it took a quantum leap of the imagination to infer the visual information drones would eventually deliver. It began with cartography, the extreme view from above, one of man’s oldest pictorial urges to satisfy an everlasting curiosity about the world we occupy. Mapmaking was undertaken by visionaries in all cultures, on all continents, the oldest known map dating back 25,000 years. Maps derived from a combination of knowledge and imagination, with a fair measure of extrapolating thrown in until we knew more.

 

If drone photography is a radical new aesthetic, it is not only because of its endless possibilities, but because its new point of view represents the ultimate fulfilment of our oldest dream, to fly like a bird and look down.

(by Brooks Riley)

 

View of Vienna from a Balloon by Otto Wagner, 1899

 

publicado às 05:41

 

 

 

By showing that scientific facts are the product of all-too-human procedures, these critics charge, Latour [Bruno Latour]whether he intended to or not — gave license to a pernicious anything-goes relativism that cynical conservatives were only too happy to appropriate for their own ends.

 

Day-to-day research — what he termed science in the making — appeared not so much as a stepwise progression toward rational truth as a disorderly mass of stray observations, inconclusive results and fledgling explanations. Far from simply discovering facts, scientists seemed to be, as Latour and Woolgar wrote in “Laboratory Life,” “in the business of being convinced and convincing others.” During the process of arguing over uncertain data, scientists foregrounded the reality that they were, in some essential sense, always speaking for the facts; and yet, as soon as their propositions were turned into indisputable statements and peer-reviewed papers — what Latour called ready-made science — they claimed that such facts had always spoken for themselves. That is, only once the scientific community accepted something as true were the all-too-human processes behind it effectively erased or, as Latour put it, black-boxed.

 

 

Ava Kofman in Bruno Latour, 'The Pst-Truth Philosopher, Mounts a Defense of Science

 

publicado às 06:25


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